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ABSTRACT
This Article asserts that the move from the industrial age to the
information age represents a fundamental change to our society on
such a widespread basis that the legal order must reexamine the
premises about how our society functions, assessing whether
foundational elements of U.S. Common Law remain valid. This
Article first confronts briefly the continuing acceptance of certain
foundational premises in contract and intellectual property law,
illustrating that such premises are no longer supported by the
realities of modern society. With fundamental change challenging
multiple areas of law in the information age, this problem is worthy
of widespread inquiry by legal scholars in various fields. This
Article then turns to a detailed analysis of the premises supporting
shareholder primacy in corporate law, demonstrating that the historic
justifications for allocations of ownership, control and duties no
longer support these premises. Based on the relative needs of today’s
businesses vis-à-vis the contributions of various other constituencies,
this Article asserts that employees should also have certain duties
owed to them. This Article concludes with a novel model for
creating such a stake in the form of a springing right to profit
sharing.
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone knows how much the world has changed in the last two
hundred years. Some changes have been incremental, like moving from
horse drawn carriages to automobiles as a basic means of transportation.
Others have been quantum, such as moving from an industrial age to an
information age. The fundamental question for the legal community is
whether the law has adequately changed to keep pace with societal
change.
This Article asserts that we have reached such a reflection point in
the development of the common law; that the move from the local
merchant, isolationist and industrial age to the mass market, globally
intertwined, information age1 represents such a fundamental change to
our society, that the legal order must step back and reexamine the
underlying premises about how our society functions and what is
reasonable in each area of U.S. law in order to assess whether those
premises remain valid.2 Some areas of law may hardly be affected, as
1. JOHN NAISBITT & PATRICIA ABURDENE, MEGATRENDS 11 (1982); TONY
MURPHY, ACHIEVING BUSINESS VALUE FROM TECHNOLOGY (2002).
2. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 204-05 (2005). Commentators have asserted this claim with
respect to individual areas of law already, but as fundamental shifts to the information
age have become even clearer, the need for a wholesale undertaking has become
apparent. See Susan J. Drucker, The Tenets of Jurisdiction: Lost in Cyberspace, 69-
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their premises remain valid, whereas other areas may need a radical
restructuring to reflect current realities.
This Article will briefly examine the continuing validity of certain
foundational premises in contract and intellectual property law merely to
illustrate that such premises are no longer supported by the realities of
modern society. With fundamental change confronting multiple areas of
law in the information age, this is indeed a problem worthy of
widespread inquiry by legal scholars in various fields.
The Article will then turn to a detailed analysis of the continuing
validity of the premises supporting shareholder primacy,3 looking at the
historic justifications for allocating ownership, control and duties to
determine whether the premises upon which said structure is founded
remain true today. This examination will demonstrate that these
premises are no longer valid and that, based on the current relative needs
of the business and contributions by various constituencies, employees
should have certain duties owed to them as well. This Article concludes
with a proposed model for such a stake.
I. THE NEED TO REEXAMINE FOUNDATIONAL PREMISES
A. THE HISTORICAL NEED FOR CHANGE
Law, by its very nature, is designed to help instill order and give
predictability to human interactions and undertakings.4 To do this, for
DEC N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 34 (1997) (arguing for the need to look back to first principles in
jurisdictional law). But see Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1145 (2000) (arguing that the cyber revolution does not require the creation of a
new body of cyberlaw and that for various areas of law no radical change has occurred).
3. The term “Shareholder Primacy” is used to describe the view that all rights and
duties in a corporation ultimately flow to the shareholders. The use of the term
“corporation” in this Paper refers to any for-profit artificial business entity with
multiple owners, regardless of actual form. It is used merely for ease of reference.
Nevertheless, as will be described in more detail, differences in whether an entity is
closely or publicly held, and whether it has solely active investors who run the business
or a mixture of active and passive owners, will have a bearing on the relative needs of
the enterprise and contributions of potential stakeholders.
4. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 48
(2000); ROSLYN WEISS, SOCRATES DISSATISFIED: AN ANALYSIS OF PLATO’S CRITO 125
(1998); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 172 (Anders Wedberg
trans., 2007).
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any given endeavor, the law must validate either the way people
customarily behave in similar circumstances or it must develop a model
norm of behavior for people to follow. The United States, as a common
law nation, has done precisely this historically. To settle disputes that
came before the courts, judges would either look to what were the
customary norms of behavior for such activities or would otherwise ask
what a “reasonably prudent person” would do in similar circumstances.5
In each area of law, these customary norms and reasonable person
standards are presumed baselines of proper conduct—the premises upon
which the legal system is based.
Over time, a complex legal order emerged in common law
countries based on precedent, a system using previously decided cases
to determine the outcome in similar situations.6 While this is both
efficient7 and promotes the important societal goals of consistency and
predictability,8 it fails to consider the possibility that society itself may
have radically changed, either due to evolving societal values or
technological innovation. If radical change has occurred, the stagnant
law created by adherence to precedent may become out of touch with
the realities of the society it is governing. As such, it will become illsuited to the purported basis for the very law being applied: to have
legal rules that are reasonable to the circumstances of the situation.
In modern common law societies, this disconnect between the law
as it has developed and society as it has evolved may be resolved by
piecemeal legislative reform or by judges deviating from precedent. The
judge may do this either by distinguishing precedent from the conflict
presented on a factual basis or by using his equitable powers.9 However,
5. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 1 (2011); C. E. F. RICKETT & THOMAS G. W.
TELFER, INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE 342
(2003). See generally CHARLES W. BACON & FRANKYLN S. MORSE, THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE LAW (2000); GEORGE F. COLE & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 106 (2006); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY OF LAW 88 (1996).
6. See generally BACON ET AL., supra note 5; COLE ET AL., supra note 5, at 106.
7. See generally Paul H. Ruben, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply &
Demand, 13 S. CT. ECON. L. REV. 19 (2005).
8. Robert G. Boliek, Jr., Appellate Practice and Procedure, 59 MERCER L. REV.
1075, 1092 (2008).
9. RICKETT & TELFER, supra note 5, at 342; JEFFREY F. BEATTY & SUSAN S.
SAMUELSON, LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 10 (2010). Note, however, that judges are often
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this is a haphazard solution to the problem. If society has changed
dramatically, such an approach will result in numerous rules remaining
valid that are based on a societal structure that no longer exists. In such
situations, the better approach is for the legal system to take a step back
from the legal order it has grown comfortable with and to ask whether
the underlying premises remain valid. If the premises remain valid, the
legal system can continue forward with minor adjustments as necessary,
but once the premises are no longer supported by reality, it is time to
discard those premises and replace them with a new set that is in sync
with society.
Historically, such radical restructuring is not unfamiliar to the
common law system. At the time of the Norman Conquest, English law
rested in the County or Hundred Courts, which applied local custom.10
Over time, these courts were replaced by various feudal courts that
continued to apply local custom, as well as by the introduction of the
curia regis (the king’s dispensing of justice; later to become the Royal
Courts).11 By the thirteenth century, the Royal Court had become an
institution unto itself and was no longer strictly tied to the king. Over
time, the courts’ jurisdiction grew, in part because of the courts’ desire
to obtain fees, but more importantly because of the perception by the
people that such courts rendered better judgments.12 By the end of the
middle ages, the Royal Courts handled almost all matters, applying the
“Common Law.”13 In order to appear before the court, the average
person had to obtain a writ. Once the list of basic writs was established,
it was little modified for hundreds of years.14 Unfortunately, the writ
system became mired in procedural technicality, which led it to focus
less on finding justice and more on merely resolving disputes.15 By the
15th century, dissatisfaction with the Royal Courts led to the creation of
courts of equity, empowered to make decisions based on the equity of
reluctant to invoke equity when faced with precedent. See RENE DAVID & JOHN E. C.
BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD TODAY 304-305 (2d ed. 1978).
10. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 9, at 290.
11. There were also Ecclesiastical Courts applying Cannon Law. Id.
12. Id. at 291.
13. Id. at 292.
14. Id. The first compilation of writs listed 56 and was compiled in 1227. By 1832,
only 20 more writs had been added. However, writs could issue for similar instances
not strictly covered by the terms of the writ as well. See id. at 292-93.
15. Id. at 295.
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the case.16 Ultimately, the Common Law (Royal) Courts, which
generally relied upon precedent to decide cases, were also empowered
with rules of equity, leading to the demise of separate courts of equity.17
However, over time, even these rules of equity have become largely
fixed and today’s judges are unlikely to use equity to depart
fundamentally from the holdings of precedent.18 With the establishment
of the United States, the common law was adopted from Britain.
However, British common law was modified as necessary to reflect the
needs and values of early U.S. society.19
This brief and highly simplified history of the development of the
common law shows a recurring theme. Legal systems were put in place
to support the society of the era, but each of them ceased to serve the
needs of society as society changed over time. Once the legal order
ceased to meet societal needs, it had to be replaced by a new set of rules
or institutions. Although legislative action and equity powers help keep
the modern system from imploding, the fundamental truth remains that
without periodic overhauls, a precedent based system will eventually get
out of step with an ever-changing society. When this happens, the law
ceases to adequately and accurately order its citizens. The move from
the industrial age to the information age presents a radical and
ubiquitous change in the very manner in which society functions. As
such, it is imperative that the legal system reexamine its foundational
premises in a wholesale manner.20

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 300-03.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 305.
PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
COLONIES 8 (2005).
20. This claim has been made with respect to certain individual areas of law
already. See Drucker, supra note 2.
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B. THE CONTRACTS EXAMPLE21
There is perhaps no area of law with a more obvious disconnect
between fundamental premises and modern reality than contracts.22 One
of the most basic ideas in contract law is the notion of freedom of
contract—parties may, with minimal limitations, enter into contracts
with one another on such terms as they see fit.23 Of course the corollary
to this freedom is that if one party does not like the deal being offered,
that party is free to walk away and look for a better set of terms
elsewhere. Based upon the premise that one has freedom of contract,
U.S. courts have consistently held that almost all validly executed
contracts are enforceable, regardless of how one-sided or egregious their
terms.24 The only significant exceptions are when contract terms are so
outrageous that if one party had been aware of them, he or she would
not have entered into the deal or when a term is facially
unconscionable.25
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). This example is
well understood by the academic community and numerous scholars have written on
one or more aspects of the problem described in this Article. See, e.g., W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1188-89 (1983); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz,
Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for Software, 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 687, 687 (2004) (stating that over 100 articles have been written on the
enforceability of end user licenses); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic
Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV 1041
(2005). Taken together, it is clear that this rule of law continues to be adhered to even
after its foundational premise is well understood to no longer be the case (although the
justification for such continued adherence has been forced to shift to other grounds).
Oakley, supra note 21, at 1048.
22. It is important to recognize that any description of “modern reality” is by its
nature a generalization and not applicable to all circumstances. However, when crafting
the default rules for an area of law, it seems appropriate to look to the most common
occurrences and then create exceptions as necessary.
23. Edward A. Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the Bargain Hypothesis:
An Introduction, 5 AKRON L. REV. 1, 1 (1972); see E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, 1
FARNSWORTH § 4.26, at 478-79 (2d ed. 1990).
24. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 7 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 455 (2002); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see generally Oakley, supra note 24.
25. See Oakley, supra note 21, at 1046; U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2005); Craig
Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied
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Stepping back to the time of its adoption, one can see that this
premise made sense in the context of commercial interactions as
recently as 75 years ago or so. Historically, most contracts were between
customers and small businesses, where the customer could actually
negotiate the terms of the contract with the business because they were
on relatively equal economic footing.26 Additionally, the terms of the
contract were relatively simple and straightforward (possibly even a
handshake deal), with little in the way of “fine print” or “boilerplate”
provisions, so the customer could understand what he was bargaining
for. Equally important, information was not as easily transmitted as it is
today, so there was at least a reasonable likelihood that going to another
business could achieve a deal on different terms.
Looking at the world in 2012, we can see that each of these facts is
no longer the case. The overwhelming majority of contracts entered into
today are between mass-market providers and customers;27 and massmarket businesses do not negotiate the terms of their contracts.28
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit
Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 946-47 (1986). It has been suggested that the number
of cases where this has occurred is in the “tens or hundreds.” James R. Maxeiner,
Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28
YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 121 (2003).
26. Relatively equal economic standing appears to be the controlling factor in
whether freedom of contract truly exists. See Farnsworth, supra note 23, § 4.26, at 479;
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.59, at 436. If the smaller party is
conducting a significant amount of business, the larger party, even if not normally
willing to negotiate contract terms, usually will do so. For example, if an individual
wishes to rent a car from Avis for a weekend, the car will be offered on Avis’ standard
terms, but if a party (be it an individual or a business) wishes to rent 50 cars for a year,
Avis would likely be willing to deviate from some of its standard terms. Given that the
size of the transaction necessary to induce the merchant to negotiate increases as the
merchant’s size increases, the ability of the consumer to negotiate with merchants has
diminished as most transactions have shifted away from smaller local businesses to
mass merchants.
27. As early as 1983, one scholar asserted that standard form contracts comprise
over ninety-nine percent of all contracts—an observation that came before mass
consumer purchasing of computer software and the creation of the internet. See
Slawson, supra note 21, at 529; see generally Oakley, supra note 21, at 1047-48.
28. Admittedly, there are still negotiated contracts between businesses of adequate
size, but these comprise a mere fraction of the total contracts entered into in the U.S.
See Slawson, supra note 21, at 529; Farnsworth, supra note 23, § 4.26, at 479; CORBIN,
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Everyone has to look only at his own life to know the truth of this
assertion. In what percentage of the purchases that you make on a daily
basis could you have changed the terms of the deal? Just try negotiating
the fine print at Best Buy, McDonalds, Hertz, Delta, Amazon.com,
American Express, BP or Apple: the terms of these contracts are strictly
“take it or leave it.”29 Nowhere has the “take it or leave it” nature of
contracts become more glaringly evident than in the case of shopping on
the web. One can click to see the terms of the deal, but it is not possible
to alter the terms of the merchant’s offer.30 Similarly, many items are
now sold with warranty and other terms inside the box (the “shrink-wrap
license”), where the customer cannot even see the terms of the contract
until after the purchase has been completed.31 These types of
transactions further underscore the pervasiveness of contracts where one
side has no actual ability to negotiate the terms.
The inability to negotiate the terms of a contract might be tolerable
if different merchants offered substantially different terms, but lawyers
frequently borrow well-drafted clauses so that any clause that one
attorney develops to benefit a client in a particular industry will soon
find its way into the contracts of all companies in that industry. Not only
is a customer left to “take it or leave it” regarding the legal terms of his
deal with a merchant, but if he leaves it, he is unlikely to find better
terms elsewhere.32

supra note 26, § 5.59C, at 436. There are also a large number of “immediate exchange
contracts” (e.g., restaurants and grocery stores, where a customer pays for
goods/services and immediately receives them), and a significant, but ever-diminishing
number of these are with small, local businesses that might be willing to negotiate
terms. These numbers are diminishing because mass market providers are driving local
providers out of business. Nevertheless, the very nature of these transactions virtually
eliminates the need for spelling out the terms of the contract—the goods or services are
received by the customer concurrently with the merchant receiving payment, so there is
little need for detail and a relatively low likelihood of a dispute arising that would
require a contract to clarify the terms of the transaction. Furthermore, many of these
immediate exchanges are with large businesses and are actually standard form
contracts. See Slawson, supra note 21, at 529.
29. Farnsworth, supra note 23, § 4.26, at 479; see Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v.
Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965).
30. Oakley, supra note 21, at 1048.
31. Id. at 1050.
32. See generally GERRIT DE GEEST, CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 117 (2011).
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Finally, with convoluted drafting, legal terms of art and the sheer
volume of boilerplate clauses involved in the average contract, it is
unlikely that a consumer will bother to read the terms of the contract,
much less understand the ramifications of the various clauses.33
Given that the underlying reality that historically supported the
presumption that there is freedom of contract no longer exists, is it not
time to drop the presumption in favor of a legal order that helps ensure
individual consumers receive fair terms in the contracts they enter into
but cannot negotiate? Germany and the European Union have done
exactly this by invoking minimum standards in standard form consumer
contracts,34 while the United States continues to pretend that freedom of
contract exists for consumers in most transactions.
C. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXAMPLE35
One of the basic tenets of intellectual property law is that inventors
need an economic incentive to create.36 This incentive is structured as a
limited time monopoly over the production and distribution of the
creation.37 More often than not, this monopoly right is transferred to the
manufacturer or distributor of the product, who then bears the cost and
risk for producing and distributing the product in return for the bulk of
the reward for a successful creation.38 Meanwhile, the inventor typically

33.
34.

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 24, at 436-37.
See Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L95); Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB]
[Civil Code] Jan. 1, 2002 Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse [Schubert] Buch 2; see also
Oakley, supra note 21; Maxeiner, supra note 25.
35. There has been some speculation that a fundamental change in the concept of
intellectual property ownership is needed in the information age. See FRIEDMAN, supra
note 2, at 217-19.
36. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); see generally Mark A.
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justification for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129, 132-35 (2004).
37. Id.
38. Theoretically, in very limited circumstances, a business might acquire an
invention that could hurt its business by paying the inventor for all rights to his
creation. Such an acquisition serves the purpose of burying the invention in the hopes
that by the time the monopoly right has ended, the market conditions will have changed
to the point that the invention is no longer a threat to the business. However, an
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has a residual interest in the creation that takes the form of a royalty—a
payment from the manufacturer/distributor based on its sales. While the
need to incentivize and reward creativity does not appear to have
changed, the realities of the marketplace have undergone a fundamental
change.39
When patent and copyright laws were in their infancy, a very
different market existed for inventions and creations. Until recently, the
primary products seeking copyright protection were books, records and
movies shown in theatres. Production and distribution costs for such
products were relatively high and the size of the consumer market
relatively small, so the publisher of such material was undertaking a
significant risk in producing the material, including a meaningful risk
that the product might prove to be unprofitable.40 With patented goods,
monopoly protection of 17+ years made sense when it could take over a
decade to have significant national market penetration, and many
products had a useful market life of decades.41
Today’s market paints a different picture. Thanks to the internet
and ever-decreasing communications costs,42 there is a global
economist will point out the folly of such a proposition. See Dwight R. Lee,
Opportunity Cost and Hidden Inventions, FEE.ORG, http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/
detail/opportunity-cost-and-hidden-inventions/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012). Some
nations have chosen to deal with this potential course of action by requiring that patents
be worked within a specific time period or else face forfeiture of the monopoly right.
See generally PCT Patents and Other International Patents, BITLAW.COM,
http://www.bitlaw.com/patent/international.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
39. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003) (discussing patent rights as incentives in specific
industries).
40. The adoption of just-in time logistics has dramatically reduced inventory costs.
See Presentation, Inventory on Demand in the Digital Age: Breakthroughs in Publisher
Creation Through New Models in Publishing and Inventory Practices Presentation (Feb.
16, 2011), http://www.toccon.com/toc2011/public/schedule/detail/18086.
41. The fact that patentees are increasingly failing to pay maintenance fees can be
seen as a sign that the useful lives of patents are decreasing. See Dennis Crouch &
Jason Rantanen, Paying Maintenance Fees, PATENTLYO (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.
patentlyo.com/patent/2011/03/paying-maintenance-fees.html. As one indication of the
historic lifespan of most physical products, it is worth noting the physical infrastructure
of U.S. cities in 1990 was based on inventions over 100 years old. See JOHN NAISBITT
& PATRICIA ABURDENE, MEGATRENDS 2000 305 (1990).
42. Deloitte Center for the Edge, The 2010 Shift Index, 56-7, 71-3 (2010) available
at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/TM
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marketplace.43 A new invention can obtain worldwide market
penetration in just a few years,44 but its lifespan has been equally
reduced.45 We live in a disposable society where everyone wants the
latest mobile phone, laptop, tablet and/or iPad. Living in an information
age, an increasingly large percentage of the U.S economy is in
copyrightable materials (music, movies, digital books, for-pay
television), producing a never-ceasing tsunami of products that are
consumed and forgotten in favor of the next wave.46
For the manufacturer/distributor, the amount of risk being taken has
decreased as well.47 For one thing, the market is much larger—with over
T_us_tmt/Shift%20Index%202010/us_tmt_si_shift%20Index2010_110310.pdf
[hereinafter Deloitte Center for the Edge].
43. Freedman, supra note 2, at 150-159, 230; NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note
41, at 19-77, 299-300; Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 118.
44. See BRETT KING, BANK 2.0: HOW CUSTOMER BEHAVIOR AND TECHNOLOGY
WILL CHANGE THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 33 (2010); Chris Herbert, Chart:
Global Smartphone Penetration by Region 2009-2014, B2B SPECIALIST (June 20,
2010), http://b2bspecialistPosterous.com/chart-global-smartphone-penetration-by-reg
ion; Apple had over one billion worldwide application downloads in its first nine
months. Press Release, Apple Inc., Apple’s Revolutionary App Store Downloads Top
One Billion in Just Nine Months (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009
/04/24appstore.html; Fifteen million iPads were sold in the first year alone. Darrell
Etherington, The Unlikely Story of the iPad, One Year In, GIGAOM (Jan. 27, 2011, 11:30
AM), http://gigaom.com/apple45/the-unlikely-story-of-the-ipad-one-year-in.
45. See generally Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 899, 912 (1993). For example, cell phones in the U.S. are replaced
roughly every 22 months. See Americans replace their cell phones every 2 years, Finns
– every six, a study claims, PHONEARENA.COM (July 11, 2011, 10:50 PM), http://www.
phonearena.com/news/Americans-replace-their-cell-phones-every-2-years-Finns—eve
ry-six-a-study-claims_id20255.
46. Consumers spent over $550 million for ringtones in 2007. BMI Forecasts
Ringtone Market Down 8% in 2007, ALL ACCESS MUSIC GROUP (Mar. 27, 2007, 11:47
PM), http://www.allaccess.com/net-news/archive/story/22940/bmi-forecasts-ringtone-m
arket-down-8-in-2007. Over 140 new apps are added daily to Facebook alone. Adam
Singer, Social Media, Web 2.0 and Internet Stats, THE FUTURE BUZZ (Jan. 12, 2009),
http://thefuturebuzz.com/2009/01/12/social-media-web-20-Internet-numbers-stats.
47. This is clearly not true for all products and industries. For example,
pharmaceuticals require massive expenditures to develop, test and market. They may
require an intellectual property protection regime similar to what currently exists. See
Burk & Lemley, supra note 39, at 1616-17.
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300 million people in the U.S, and a potential global market of just
under 7 billion.48 Of course not every product will be a roaring success,
but that does not mean it will not be profitable. One need only look at
the huge proliferation in television stations and magazines to see that the
population is large enough to support a staggering number of niche
interests and tastes.49 It is equally important to note that production and
distribution costs for many “information age” products have continued
to decrease. When CDs and DVDs—single pressed pieces of plastic—
were introduced, they were far cheaper to produce than cassette and
VHS tapes, magnetically coated tapes that must be spooled and enclosed
in a plastic shell with various moving parts. Now that music, movies and
books have become digital, a single computer can potentially distribute
the product to everyone on the planet.
In such a society, do long-term (20+ year) monopolies continue to
make sense? Long-term monopolies have led to an ongoing, glaring
market defect that harms the consumer. In a properly functioning
market, the price of a product should move towards its production costs,
with competing businesses battling for market share by lowering their
prices to attract consumers.50 However, with information age products,
this has not occurred—CDs and DVDs had higher price points than
cassette and VHS tapes for the same product during the period when
both were being sold even though the latter were more expensive to

48. U.S. & World Population Clocks, CENUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/main/w
ww/popclock.html (last visited Oct. 20. 2012).
49. See AL LIEBERMAN & PATRICIA ESGATE, THE ENTERTAINMENT MARKETING
REVOLUTION 111 (2002). In fact, the modern media’s ability to cater to niche markets
and to disaggregate consumers for marketing purposes makes smaller target markets
more valuable. The consistent reutilization of existing content, while attractive to a
small audience of aficionados, would be obsolete to a broader consumer audience. The
average home receives almost 120 television channels. Nielsen, US Homes Receive a
Record 118.6 TV Channels on Average, MARKETING CHARTS (June 13, 2008),
http://www.marketingcharts.com/television/us-homes-receive-a-record-1186-tv-chann
els-on-average-4929/. There are over 20,000 magazines sold in North America alone.
The Ass’n of Magazine Media, 1988 – 2010 Number of Magazine Titles by Bureaus,
MAGAZINE.ORG, http://www.magazine.org/insights-resources/research-publications
/trends-data/ magazine-industry-facts-data/1988-2010-number (last visited Nov. 28,
2012).
50. PAUL J. J. WELFENS, INNOVATIONS IN MACROECONOMICS 342 (2008).
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produce.51 Today, the digital download is often the same price as a DVD
or CD even though it has virtually no distribution costs.52 Why does a
product that is cheaper to produce and distribute cost more? It costs
more because each product is a mini-monopoly.53 If a consumer wants
the newest pop phenom’s CD/Download, there is only one company
with rights to that product and rival music companies do not have a
product the consumer can substitute for it. As such, the monopoly holder
can price each format solely according to what consumers are willing to
pay. Since the newer technology is seen as superior, consumers are
willing to pay more, so the company charges more for the product
despite it being cheaper to produce.54
For such information age products, would society not be better
served by requiring dual licensing when an inventor/creator decides to
license his creation?55 If a band had to license its new album to two
music companies, there would be no monopoly for it, and so the
companies, through the forces of market competition, would be forced
51. See Andrew D. Smith, Now Blu-ray disc prices must fall, DALLASNEWS.COM
(Dec. 1, 2008, 1:03 PM), http://techblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2008/12/; Amy
Harmon, MUSIC; What Price Music?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/10/12/arts/music-what-pricemusic.html?pagewanted=all&s
rc=pm; Johnnie L. Roberts, The Disc That Saved Hollywood, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19,
2001, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2001/08/19/the-disc-thatsaved-hollywood.html.
52. Dan Rayburn, This Is Just Stupid: Digital HD Downloads Still Cost More than
DVDs, STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (Mar. 20, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://blog.streamingmed
ia.com/the_business_of_online_vi/2009/03/this-is-just-stupid-digital-hd-downloadsstill-cost-more-than-dvds.html.
53. Welfens, supra note 50, at 342.
54. In fact, through licensing or digital rights management, newer technologies
present the opportunity for significant price discrimination, as well as frustrating
traditional doctrines such as first sale.
55. See Lemley, supra note 36, at 137-38 (“Insofar as the new ex post incentive
theory suggests that control by a single firm is necessary to induce efficient distribution,
therefore, it is theoretically flawed and empirically unsound.”). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115
(2006) (compulsory music license for cover songs). One can also imagine various
permutations on this to account for a primary licensor that has undertaken additional
investment (and risk) in discovering, recording and promoting the band versus a
secondary licensor who has not. To offset free rider issues and to maintain incentives
for promoter/distributors, a two-tiered royalty system could be developed with lower
rates for the primary licensor.
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to price their products in line with their production costs, leading to
lower prices for consumers.56
II. CORPORATE LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE
The rights of potential stakeholders and the duties owed to them by
corporations are built upon four premises, each of which were true
during the industrial age, but none of which remain (or need remain)
entirely true in the information-based economy.57 These four premises
are:

56. Of course the ease of copying and distributing digital information may
ultimately make this a moot point. If companies price their products too high, people
may choose to steal them rather than buy them. In turn this is leading to subscription
services providing access to a broad range of music/entertainment products for a set fee.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 217 (on theft risk); Sasha McCune, Subscription Music
Services, MASHABLE (Sep. 7, 2011), http://visual.ly/digital-music-subscription-servicecompared.
57. While these premises would have been well-known to an economist or
businessman throughout much of the industrial age, other criteria have been used to
justify having all corporate duties flow only to shareholders in the modern era. For
example, with the growth of the law and economics movement in the second half of the
twentieth century, corporations have been viewed as essentially a nexus of contracts in
which corporate duties and powers flow only to shareholders, thereby maximizing
efficiency and wealth. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 14, 38 (1991); Kent Greenfield, The
Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 311 (1998). This position has
not been without its critics. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008);
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); O’Connor, supra note 45, at 905. In the Easterbrook model,
other constituencies may have claims, but only to what they bargain for. EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 37. This begs the question, why are some contract terms
freely negotiable while others are fixed by law? Greenfield, supra note 57, at 312.
However, much of the “negotiating” by various constituencies is not really bargaining
at all, but rather relies upon the underlying system enshrined in the legal order.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 34. For commentary on the limitations of a
contractual analysis for employees, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as
Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV.
45, 54-69 (1991); see generally Greenfield, supra note 57; O’Connor, supra note 45. As
such, an examination of the original economic assumptions that gave rise to the
corporate structure, rather than a latter era’s justification, merits examination.
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Capital is scarce;58
Businesses need large amounts of capital;59
Labor is plentiful;60 and
Investors of capital take all the risk and labor takes no
risk.61

Based upon these premises, courts have concluded62 that
fundamentally the investors (shareholders) are the sole owners of the
corporation; that corporations exist to maximize profits for their owners,
the investors; and that no duties are owed to other potential stakeholders,
such as the employees or the communities in which these corporations
58. HOWARD ROTHMAN BOWEN, TOWARD A SOCIAL ECONOMY (1948); MICHAEL R.
LISSACK & HUGH P GUNZ, MANAGING COMPLEXITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: A VIEW IN
MANY DIRECTIONS 39 (2005); NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 15; Greenfield,
supra note 57.
59. See generally LIONEL D. LYLES, ESSIE THIBODEAUX LYLES, HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS AFFECTS ON THE
AMERICAN FAMILY: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1920 Vol. 1 (2003).
60. Historians have noted that in the first half of the 19th century the U.S. had
various labor shortages requiring investments in technology and other labor saving
devices. OTTO NEWMAN & RICHARD DE ZOYSA, THE AMERICAN DREAM IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 15 (editors ed. 1999); H.J. HABAKKUK, AMERICAN AND BRITISH
TECHNOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1962). Nonetheless, generally labor has
been seen as a more readily available factor of production than capital. Id. As America
established itself, waves of immigration made labor plentiful in the U.S. as well.
JEREMY THORNTON, NEW INDUSTRIES, NEW JOBS: BRITISH IMMIGRANTS COME TO
AMERICA, 1830S-1890S (2003); C. FRED BERGSTEN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WORLD ECONOMY: FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE NEXT DECADE 344 (2005);
NEWMAN & DE YOYSA, supra note 60, at 16.
61. This premise can also be reformulated. Workers are entitled to compensation
for their time whereas investors are not so entitled for their money. These various
permutations are discussed in Part II.D. See infra notes 118-124 and accompanying
text; EASTERBOOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 36 (risk takers get residual claim to
profit); see Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991).
62. In the modern era, most of these conclusions are also stated in the statutory
provisions by which states allow corporations to be formed. Regardless of their source,
however, the validity of these premises remains in question. If these premises are not
correct, the philosophical basis for these conclusions is destroyed and alternative
concepts of ownership and duty should be considered.
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exist.63 A corporation’s managers, its board of directors, can choose to
do many things that may benefit such other constituencies (e.g., bonuses
and profit sharing plans for employees), but these actions must be
justified as ultimately maximizing shareholder profits (e.g., creating
incentives to reduce worker turnover thereby reducing training costs or
making workers more productive). A board taking actions solely to
benefit non-shareholder constituencies, or proclaiming a duty being
owed to such groups, is anathema to U.S. corporate law, and would
constitute a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties.64
A. CAPITAL IS SCARCE
Historically, a relatively small group of people has supplied the
large amounts of capital needed to fund corporations.65 There were
several reasons for this. First, the vast majority of workers did not have
the means (or did not perceive themselves as having the means) to invest
in the stock market, so it was left to smaller numbers of wealthy
individuals to invest.66 Second, most people did not have the
63. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del 1986); Blasius Indus. v.
Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at
36-38; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 573 (2003); Macey, supra note 61, at 23;
Greenfield, supra note 57, at 288-94.
64. However, in the late 1980s, a number of states modified their corporation
statutes to allow the directors to consider the interests of other constituencies. Such
language was not included in the subsequent revision to the Model Business
Corporation Act. Macey, supra note 61, at 1; O’Connor, supra note 45, at 951-52; Van
Wezel Stone, supra note 57, at 45. Additionally, a handful of states have recently
created new types of entities, L3Cs and benefit corporations, which are expressly
required to pursue goals for the benefit of society in addition to making a profit. See
generally Anne Field, Benefit Corporations, L3Cs and All the Rest: Making Sense of
Those Confusing Choices, FORBES (May 25, 2012, 9:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/annefield/2012/05/25/benefit-corporations-l3cs-and-all-the-rest-making-sense-ofthose-confusing-choices/.
65. Prior to the Great Depression only 2% of Americans owned stock. Great
Depression, OHIO HISTORY CENTRAL, http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec
=500 (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
66. See generally Historical Income Tables, CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html, for household income adjusted
to current dollars since 1967.
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sophistication to invest. Rather, the average person was afraid of putting
his money in the stock market.67 Third, the transaction costs in dealing
with shareholders were relatively high since any increase in the number
of shareholders in a company increased bookkeeping and
communication costs. It therefore made sense for corporations to focus
their energy on a smaller number of investors who contributed larger
amounts.68
In the information age, capital need not be scarce.69 As a practical
matter, over the last century the U.S. stock market has seen a shift
towards the majority of Americans being members of the investor
class.70 Most of this investment has come through pension and
retirement funds.71 These funds, generally bundled together for all
employees of a company or even larger units, have provided the same
benefits to the company as large individual investors because from the
company’s perspective, it was dealing with a single entity.72
Furthermore, employers often bring in investment counselors to help
employees choose their investments, and these counselors have educated
several generations regarding the fact that over time, money in the stock
market produces significantly better returns than money invested as a

67. The Great Depression further reinforced this belief. D. H. POST, THE FEAR
BASED LIFE 28 (2010).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 78-81.
69. One sign that capital has become less scarce is the fact that the cost of capital
has steadily decreased over time. Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 13.
70. Percentage of Americans with Stock Hits Eleven-Year Low, Gallup Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2011, 06:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
04/21/stock-market-us-real-estate-gallup_n_851786.html; Helen Huntley, More
Americans Investing in Stock: While the Market Rises in Popularity, the Value of
Holdings is Relatively Low, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Sep. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/27/Business/More_Americans_invest.shtml.
See
generally NEWMAN & DE ZOYSA, supra note 60, at 169.
71. See Huntley, supra note 70.
72. INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY GUIDE TO THE MARKETS
48 (1996); STEPHEN J. ZACCARO & RICHARD J. KLIMOSKI, THE NATURE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP: UNDERSTANDING THE PERFORMANCE IMPERATIVES
CONFRONTING TODAY’S LEADERS 163, 163 (2001); see generally JAMES P. HAWLEY &
ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC (2000).
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creditor (i.e., treasury notes, certificates of deposit, bank accounts).73
The combination of education and having one’s retirement funds thrust
into the market has increased the sophistication of the average American
and removed much of the fear of stock market investments.
Although this historic trend is noteworthy and helps show that
capital is not as scarce as it once was, it only scratches the surface in
terms of the capital available in the information age. Indeed, it would
appear that most Americans can afford $5-$100 to invest periodically in
the market. In 2008, Americans spent over $60 billion on lottery
tickets74 and over $10.4 billion at Starbucks, a single coffee chain.75 As a
society, we do not really think about spending $5, $10 or even $20, but
we have not reorganized the capital markets to take advantage of this
reality.76 On the other hand, politicians have figured it out. President
Barack Obama raised over $650,000,000 in donations from individuals
through a grass roots internet campaign,77 exhibiting the ability to raise
vast sums of capital in very small increments. This is the ultimate power
among over 300 million Americans and almost 7 billion people
worldwide—the ability to raise vast sums of capital in very small
increments.
73. Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation and Gold-Asset Class Performance,
INVESTORSFRIEND.COM, http://www.investorsfriend.com/asset_performance.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2012); Aswath Damodaran, Annual Returns on Stock, T.Bonds and
T.Bills: 1928 – Current (Jan. 5, 2012), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Ho
me_Page/datafile/histret.html.
74. Brad Tuttle, Q&A with The Lottery Wars Author Matthew Sweeney, TIME
MONEYLAND (June 16, 2009), http://moneyland.time.com/2009/06/16/qa-with-thelottery-wars-author-matthew-sweeney/; see generally Keith Matheny, Lottery Ticket
Sales Increase Across Country, U.S.A. TODAY MONEY (Sep. 1, 2011), http://www.usat
oday.com/money/economy/story/2011-09-01/Lottery-ticket-sales-increase-across-count
ry/50222366/1.
75. Starbucks Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/Exter
nal.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTExNzN8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1
(last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
76. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, this societal trend has important
implications. Capital would be more accessible to businesses if U.S. securities
regulation were restructured to facilitate micro-investing. Current regulations allow
companies to avoid registration if various conditions are met, but such stock is not
readily transferable. See Jack A. Rosenbloom, Direct Public Offerings on the Internet:
A Viable Means of Obtaining Capital?, 2000 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 85 (2000).
77. CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, Presidential Candidate Barack Obama
(July 30, 2009), http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/summary.php?id=n00009638
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Furthermore, historically, a company composed of many tiny
shareholders faced a potential logistical nightmare where the money
raised would almost immediately be consumed in shareholder
communication and recordkeeping costs. Computers and the internet
virtually removed this hurdle for businesses, however.78 Recordkeeping
can be handled by computers at a low-cost, with micro-investors
keeping their information up to date by logging in.79 Emails can replace
letters, annual reports and proxy solicitations can be viewed online or
downloaded, and dividends can be electronically transmitted to the bank
accounts of millions of shareholders with the push of a button—all at
virtually no cost to the company.80 At least one company has utilized
such options, even if the full realm of possibilities has not been fully
developed or explored. When Travelzoo was just getting off the ground,
it offered three free shares to everyone who set up an account.81
Although this undertaking exposed the company to the possibility of
additional administrative costs for tens of millions of shareholders
without new capital being raised, these necessary communications could
be processed at almost no expense through the use of the internet. What
is more, this example lends support to the argument that capital need not
be scarce in the information age, despite current securities regulations
that make capital appear scarcer than it really is.

78. Low-cost communications are afforded by the internet. See Deloitte Center for
the Edge, supra note 42, at 54.
79. The overwhelming majority of Americans are already active internet users. See
id. at 31, 43, 53, 74.
80. Legal restrictions on acceptable forms of communication do present certain
costs to these businesses that could be significantly reduced through reform.
81. In actuality, 700,000 people became shareholders in this way. Daniel Jimenez,
Free Stock Is Priced Right, BANKRATE.COM (Mar. 20, 1999), http://www.bankrate.com/
brm/news/advice/19990320a.asp. In 2004, after the company registered its stock (and a
split turned the three shares into six), this giveaway was worth over $600. See Joanna
Glasner, Few Step Up to Claim Free Shares, WIRED.COM, Nov. 24, 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/11/65801; Travel Zoo Election to
Participate, TRAVELZOO.COM, http://corporate.travelzoo.com/2002/Election_to_Pa
rticipate.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2012); Travelzoo Inc. (TZOO), Historical Prices,
YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=TZOO (search between 11/9/2004
and 11/17/2004) (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
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B. BUSINESSES NEED LARGE AMOUNTS OF CAPITAL
In the industrial age, the path to business success had always started
with a great idea (a great product, like Coca Cola, or a major production
innovation like Ford Motor Company’s assembly line) to attract
investors.82 Since businesses primarily produced manufactured products
in the industrial age, a great idea was not enough unless it was backed
by significant amounts of capital. Without a lot of money to build larger
and greater numbers of factories, efficiencies of scale could not be
obtained and the product could not reach consumers due to inadequate
inventory.83 Of course, the biggest need for capital has always been
early in the lifecycle of a business, at its formation or a few years
thereafter when the business proves itself on a small scale and is trying
to expand in order to cover a significant market.84 After the company
reaches a critical size, it can continue to grow through retained earnings
or by borrowing against itself.
Although this need for capital persists today in the case of physical
products, the landscape has changed insofar as high labor costs and
other factors have driven most factory jobs overseas where production
costs are lower.85 All projections point towards the continuation of this
trend.86 Thus, in the information age, the U.S. is primarily in the
business of producing information-based goods (such as entertainment
products like movies, music and television) and service products.87

82.
83.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 339-56.
CARLO M. CIPOLLA, BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: EUROPEAN
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY, 1000-1700 80 (3d ed. 1993); Deloitte Center for the Edge,
supra note 42, at 22; see generally CHARLES MORE, UNDERSTANDING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION (2000).
84. JOSEPH W. BARTLETT & PETER ECONOMY, RAISING CAPITAL FOR DUMMIES, ch.
6 (2011).
85. NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 17, 55-56, 61-62, 71-73; FRIEDMAN,
supra note 2, at 114-127; NEWMAN & DE ZOYSA, supra note 60.
86. NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 61-62; FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at
114-127; NEWMAN & DE ZOYSA, supra note 60, at 27, 191; Deloitte Center for the
Edge, supra note 42, at 11.
87. NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 12-14, 21 (also stating that most
service jobs are actually creating, processing or distributing information); NEWMAN &
DE ZOYSA, supra note 60, at 27; Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 11.
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Notably, none of these information-based goods requires significant
amounts of capital for their success.88
In the case of service products, workers are necessary to provide
the service, posing a significant expense. Nevertheless, many costly
service products, such as customer service requiring live personnel, have
been largely outsourced to countries with cheaper labor costs in the form
of non-face-to-face communication.89 The result is that services
remaining in the U.S. are often those in which the service physically
comes to the customer (e.g., repairmen, plumbers, etc.) or the customer
physically goes to the service (e.g., barbershops, mechanics, etc.). These
businesses, by and large, are relatively small and do not require a
significant capital investment to get started.90 Likewise, they expand
only by hiring more workers as profits permit.91
Although information products have upfront production costs,92
these are trivial when compared to traditional costs of manufacturing

88.
89.
90.
91.

Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 11, 25, 98.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 103-113.
Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 98, 11, 25.
Some service companies have become quite large, but they have not followed a
traditional capital intensive model to do so. Some have done so by merging with one
another (law firms and accounting firms), and others have franchised their business
models to others so that each individual franchisee takes on a comparatively small
financial undertaking.
92. For a small percentage of products there may be relatively significant
production costs, such as for some movies and television shows. Still, even here the
sheer volume of products required has moved the television industry away from
scripted shows toward quick, easy to produce, low-cost programming. In its heyday,
Friends costs $6 million per episode in primary cast salaries alone, totaling $22 million
for a season. Bill Carter, ‘Friends’ Deal Will Pay Each of its 6 Stars $22 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2002, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/12/business/frien
ds-deal-will-pay-each-of-its-6-stars-22-million.html. Now, reality television accounts
for 40% of prime time viewing options. With limited exceptions, an entire season can
be paid for with a prize of as little as $100,000, an apartment rented for a few months
and salaries paid to a handful of “B” or “C” list celebrities, amounting to well under a
million dollars total. Indeed, this does not even account for the myriad other forms of
low production cost programming and the volume of reality television outside of
primetime. Aaron Barnhart, How Reality TV Took Over Prime Time, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Dec. 06, 2010, http://www.kansascity.com/2010/12/04/2497484/how-reality-tvtook-over-prime.html; see generally REALITY TV: REMAKING TELEVISION CULTURE
(Susan Murray & Laurie Ouellette eds. 2d ed. 2009).
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and distributing tangible products. More importantly, traditional costs of
producing physical goods and distributing them are irrelevant for
information products in the digital age. Once a movie, television show,
album, book or ringtone has been created and loaded onto a server,
worldwide distribution can occur at essentially no cost.93
Thus, for a significant and ever-increasing percentage of U.S.
businesses, large amounts of capital are no longer required for success.
C. LABOR IS PLENTIFUL
In one sense, labor is as plentiful as ever; there are over 138.5
million Americans of working age, by far the most in history.94 But in
another sense, labor has never been scarcer. In the industrial age, the
demands of the workplace were minimal, requiring little education or
training for a factory job, such that essentially everyone in society was
potentially suitable for a business.95 In contrast, the information age
demands that an increasing percentage of companies have
technologically savvy employees who can adapt to a rapidly changing
world.96 Skills and proper training are necessary for the workplace of the

93. See Paul Starr, The Electronic Commons, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, March 27April 10, 2000, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~starr/articles/articles00/StarrElectronicCommons-3-00.htm (“Second, the Internet provides incentives for
commercial producers of intellectual property to shift from exclusive, high-priced forms
of distribution to more open, low-priced, or free distribution--in short, from proprietary
channels of communication to what I'll call the "commercial public domain.")
94. Tim Kane, The American Workforce: Strong Facts Trump Weak Myths, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 28, 2004), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004
/01/the-american-workforce-strong-facts-trump-weak-myths; Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics: Employer Situation Summary (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/ne
ws.release/empsit.nr0.htm. The total number of workers, combined with the lack of
coordination among them helps explain their continued relative weakness of bargaining
position relative to the businesses that hire them. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 57, at
54-69; see generally, Greenfield, supra note 57; O’Connor, supra note 45.
95. See generally O’Connor, supra note 45, at 910-13.
96. As long ago as 1956, the number of white-collar workers surpassed the number
of blue-collar workers. NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 12. By 1982, 60% of
the U.S. workforce was in information related jobs with only 13% in manufacturing
operations. Id. at 14; see also id. at 22-23, 37; NEWMAN & DE YOYSA, supra note 60, at
123; Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 15, 16, 20, 98.
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21st century.97 Studies have shown that, in absolute terms, the U.S.
suffers from a shortage of properly educated workers and the situation
will likely get worse as the demands of industry continue to move
towards better educated and technically skilled employees.98 Thus,
skilled labor is not plentiful.99
More importantly, a product’s lifespan has been dramatically
reduced.100 Fifty years ago, a company could be successful just by
having one or a small handful of quality products that it sold for decades
or longer.101 Today, companies must constantly recreate their product
lines to maintain consumer interest and sales volume.102 The examples
are endless. The number of brands in grocery stores has increased three
fold since 1991.103 The Coca-Cola Company was founded in 1892104 and
had only one Coke branded product for ninety-seven years.105 It now has
over 3,500 beverages in its portfolio, including over twenty varieties of
Coke, as well as other soft drinks, energy drinks, juices, juice drinks,
sports drinks, teas, coffees and water.106 Many of these have been

97. NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 41, at 47-48; FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at
237-49.
98. Tessa Watanabe, Shortage of Skilled Workers Looms in U.S., L.A. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/21/local/me-immiglabor21;
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 251-255; NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 31-33,
19.
99. NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 41, at 48.
100. See generally O’Connor, supra note 45, at 912.
101. Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 115 (noting that leading
companies lose ground faster than ever due to increases in competition).
102. Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 22, 31; NAISBITT & ABURDENE,
supra note 41, at 63-66 (noting that the automobile industry’s vulnerability is caused by
its failure to diversify).
103. James Surowiecki, The Decline of Brands, WIRED (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.11/brands.html.
104. Coca Cola, NNDB, http://www.nndb.com/company/371/000058197/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2012).
105. See The Coca-Cola Company Heritage Timeline, HERITAGE COCA-COLA,
http://heritage.coca-cola.com/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012) (1982-1989 Heritage
Timeline).
106. Product List, THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, http://www.thecoca-colacompany.
com/brands/brandlist.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
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introduced in the last twenty years.107 In 1967, there were only four
major television stations (CBS, NBC, ABC and PBS), with a handful of
UHF stations in larger U.S. markets.108 However, with the introduction
of cable and satellite television, the average home can now receive
almost 120 channels, all of which require new programming to fill
airtime.109 The fact that many of these stations are owned by only a
handful of companies, underscores the Herculean task of producing a
constant flow of this massive new programming.110
In addition, this modern necessity to react to decreasing product life
spans with evolving product lines is further seen in the realm of internet
and mobile services. Over 140 new applications are added every day to
Facebook alone.111 The average person replaces a cell phone every 22
months.112 In 2007, Americans spent over $550 million on new
ringtones—products with the sole function of meeting consumer
demand for novelty.113 What is more, items are often replaced not
because the old product no longer works but rather because it has fewer
features or lesser capabilities than the consumer desires. Everyone
simply wants the latest and greatest product, and companies scramble to
create the next must-have item.
107.
See The Coca-Cola Company Heritage Timeline, HERITAGE COCA-COLA,
http://heritage.coca-cola.com/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012) (1990-1999 Heritage
Timeline).
108. Mitchell Stephens, History of Television, NYU.EDU http://www.nyu.edu/class
es/stephens/History%20of%20Television%20page.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
109. Nielson, US Homes Receive a Record 118.6 TV Channels on Average,
MARKETING CHARTS (June 13, 2008), http://www.marketingcharts.com/television/ushomes-receive-a-record-1186-tv-channels-on-average-4929/.
110. See Alex, Who Owns What on Television, NEATORAMA (July 7, 2008,
3:13AM), http://www.neatorama.com/2008/07/07/who-owns-what-on-television/.
Media companies must also compete for the consumers’ interest with free web products
and new content providers. Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 77. Over 13
hours of new content is uploaded to YouTube every minute and over 100,000,000
videos were viewed per day as of 2006.
111. Adam Singer, 49 Amazing Social Media, Web 2.0 and Internet Stats., THE
FUTURE BUZZ (Jan. 12, 2009), http://thefuturebuzz.com/2009/01/12/social-media-web20-Internet-numbers-stats. On average, 900,000 blogs are posted daily. Id.
112. See supra text accompanying note 45. 90% of Americans own have a wireless
subscription. Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 43.
113. BMI Forecasts Ringtone Market Down 8% in 2007, ALL ACCESS MUSIC GROUP
(MAR. 27, 2007, 11:47 AM), http://www.allaccess.com/net-news/archive/story/22940
/bmi-forecasts-ringtone-market-down-8-in-2007.
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What has become clear is that a company’s success is no longer
tied to a single good idea or product that investors can back.114 Rather,
the success of a company is tied to its ability to innovate and produce
new products.115 This innovation stems from labor.116 In the information
age, all workers must be involved in product or production innovation
and development.117 Notwithstanding this reality, innovators have never
been perceived as plentiful, and the expansion of this responsibility for
innovation from company founders to entire workforces highlights a
scarcity of labor in today’s society.
D. INVESTORS OF CAPITAL TAKE ALL THE
RISK AND LABOR TAKES NO RISK
This final premise can be formulated in several different ways, each
of which ultimately boils down to the same conclusion: investors are the
owners of a business and workers have no ownership stake.118 Another
way to describe this premise is to say that workers are compensated for
their time and effort via salaries, whereas investors are not compensated
for their money—an investor’s only return is an interest in the
company’s equity. Therefore, investors are owners and workers are not.
A variant formulation would be to state that investors buy interests in a
company, whereas the company hires workers as employees.
At some level this premise, as put forth in the last of the
formulations above, is true by definition. If one buys something (the
investor purchases ownership in the form of stock), one owns it. This is
arguably an inalterable maxim of property law: to deny that a purchaser
owns what he purchased would destroy the very notion of private
property. As true as this may be, for example in the case of purchasing a

114.
115.
116.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 339-356.
See generally Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 21.
O’Connor, supra note 45, at 901-02; Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note
42, at 3, 4, 22, 106.
117. O’Connor, supra note 45, at 911-13; see generally Deloitte Center for the
Edge, supra note 42; NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 16.
118. The fallacy of describing a shareholder’s interest in ownership terminology has
been discussed at length by Greenfield, supra note 57, at 288-94; see also NICHOLAS
WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKETS VERSUS REGULATION 40
(1984).
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car, a subtler examination is merited with regard to business entities.
Individuals can “purchase” stakes in a business entity by contributing
money, tangible or intangible property, or services.119
So why is an up-front “purchase” of ownership for services
recognized whereas a lifetime of services to an entity as a worker
entitles one to no rights or ownership stake? One might see this as a
purely contractual matter—the investor chose to buy an ownership stake
whereas the worker chose to enter into an employment relationship.120
However, while this is no doubt true in some sense, the law often limits
the freedom of contract when structuring business entity
arrangements.121 For example, although founders of a company often
continue as its managers and could benefit personally from not owing
fiduciary duties to the other investors, corporate law limits a
corporation’s ability to eliminate the fiduciary duties of its managers,
particularly with regard to the duty of loyalty.122
Why then does the law not limit freedom of contract with respect to
business entities so that workers have some sort of ownership stake or at
least certain minimum duties owed to them? The answer to this is in part
the law’s historical perspective on the three premises previously
discussed in this Article. If it is true that capital is scarce, businesses
need large amounts of capital and labor is plentiful, why then should
labor have any duties owed to it? Workers’ contributions are seen as
being dwarfed by those of capital, so the law has not seemed fit to
protect workers based on such contributions.123 The other part of the
answer lies in the way I have chosen to describe the fourth premise: in

119. Although corporate law has long prohibited unperformed services as
consideration for stock, other business entities such as partnerships readily recognize
services, as well as cash and property, as an acceptable basis upon which one can
acquire an ownership interest. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS §§ 21, 167 (3d ed., 1983).
120. For a discussion of the hurdles facing employees in this negotiation context,
see Van Wezel Stone, supra note 57, at 54-69; see generally O’Connor, supra note 45;
Greenfield, supra note 57.
121. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 3; Greenfield, supra note 57, at
312.
122. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 3; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra
note 119, §§ 136, 137.
123. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
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the taking of risk.124 The investor puts something at risk, be it money,
property or services, and there is the possibility that the investor will
receive no return on that risk. Workers, on the other hand, are perceived
to put nothing at risk. Workers do their jobs and are paid for their
services, and hence they should not be entitled to any upside in the
business when they are not taking any of the risk in the business.
Thus, I believe the best formulation of the fourth premise is not a
tautologically true statement about ownership, but rather one that asserts
that the duties to the shareholders derive from their taking of risk that
workers do not take. Whether this premise has historically been true and
whether it remains relevant today is a further inquiry worth examining.
1. Capital’s Risk or Lack Thereof
There can be no doubt that investors take a risk when investing in a
business. When an investor buys stock in a company, there is no
guarantee that the investment will ever be repaid, much less that a profit
will be obtained. Indeed, the chances for repayment or profits are very
low given the significant number of businesses that are liquidated or go
bankrupt every year. Unless investors have already received a return on
their investments in the form of dividends (which seems highly unlikely
for many businesses that go bankrupt), they will have lost most or all of
the money they risked in buying the stock in such companies. The level
of risk that each investor takes in making his investment, however,
varies.
First, as has been previously discussed in section B, the nature of
the types of businesses that remain in the U.S.—that is, the production
of services and information goods—is not particularly capital
intensive.125 Since businesses need less capital to become operational,
investors are collectively taking less risk on any given venture simply
because less money is at stake if the business fails.

124. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 36 (risk takers have a residual
claim to profit); Greenfield, supra note 57, at 303; see also Macey, supra note 61.
125. NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 12-14, 21 (also stating that most
service jobs are actually creating, processing or distributing information); NEWMAN &
DE ZOYSA, supra note 60, at 27; Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 11, 98,
25.
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Second, as discussed above, the modern world is a huge market
catering to extraordinarily broad tastes. One can find a magazine,
television station or type of music that caters to almost any interest.
Because the U.S. is primarily a producer of services and information
goods, its businesses face less risk with their access to a national market
of over 300 million people and a potential internet world market of
almost seven billion people.126 There is a viable market for almost
anything today.127
More importantly, one must consider the comparative risks that
investors take. When an investor buys stock in a newly formed business,
one with no track record, he takes the highest risk.128 There is no way to
know for certain whether the company’s product idea has a significant
market. Even if it does, the company could still fail if the costs of
production and distribution cannot be adequately contained so that the
finished product can be delivered to the market at a reasonable price.
Moreover, if the product does manage to have a reasonable cost, there
still remains the question of whether the company has competent
managers that will make good business decisions for the company.
There is still a meaningful risk, albeit a smaller one, in the
alternative scenario where investors buy into the typical company
making its initial public offering (IPO).129 These companies have usually
been around for some time and have a proven track record of at least
moderate success, so investors know that there is a market for the
company’s product, that the company has been able to contain costs and
that the company is at least reasonably well-managed. Generally,
companies undertake an IPO to raise significantly more capital than they
have had in the past so that production can be significantly expanded.130
126.
127.

See generally Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the global marketplace presents new
risks as well in the form of increased foreign competition and information products that
are uniquely vulnerable to piracy/theft. However, these risks may refer more to the size
of one’s profits as opposed to whether one can make a profit. See generally Deloitte
Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 11.
128. EDWARD PAULSON, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO STARTING YOUR OWN
BUSINESS 53-54 (2007); Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 12; BARTLETT
& ECONOMY, supra note 84.
129. PAULSON, supra note 128, at 55-56.
130. Of course the owners of the closely held company undertaking an IPO are also
frequently interested in the significant personal rewards that an IPO will bring to them
by greatly increasing the value of their stock.
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Accordingly, there are risks associated with such expansion: will the
company grow too large too fast and kill itself through lack of cash flow
and overspending?; are the managers up to the task of managing a
significantly larger enterprise?; is there the additional market for such
increased production? These questions reflect legitimate risks for
investors; however, they are lower than those existing for start-ups with
no history to examine.
Finally, investors buying stocks in publicly held companies through
secondary trading markets take little risk.131 History shows that over
time there are few better ways to make money than to invest in the stock
market.132 Occasionally, publicly held companies go bankrupt, but that
is a relative rarity when compared to start-ups and closely held
companies.133 In general, the larger the capitalization of a company, the
lower the risk. Moreover, the risk in publicly held companies is further
reduced by the fact that as registered and traded shares, these
investments are readily transferable. If an investor concludes that the
situation does not look favorable for the company he or she has invested
in, it is possible to sell shares in a few minutes thereby eliminating the
risk of any further loss.
Furthermore, a corporation may not withhold dividends in bad faith
if an adequate corporate surplus exists.134 In practical terms, this means
the risk is greatest to investors when stock is first purchased, for this is
the time when it is theoretically possible to lose all of one’s investment.
However, over time as dividends are paid, the risk to the investor is
correspondingly reduced because one has already locked in a return on

131.
132.

See generally PAULSON, supra note 128, at 53.
Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation and Gold-Asset Class Performance, INVESTO
RSFRIEND.COM, http://www.investorsfriend.com/asset_performance.htm.
133. In 2009, 60,837 companies filed for bankruptcy, but only 207 were publicly
traded. See Matt Krantz, Back on stock market after bankruptcy protection,
USATODAY.COM (June 4, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money
/economy/2010-06-01-backfrombrink01_ST_N.htm and U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—
Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code
During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2009, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcySTatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2009/1209_f2
.pdf.
134. Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947); Dodge v.
Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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the investment equal to the total amount of dividends received.135 At
some point, the investor has received a return of all the money initially
invested in the form of dividends, while continuing to own one’s interest
in the company so that any additional dividends and the amount
eventually received for selling the stock amount to risk-free profit. Thus,
the risk for capital decreases over time as dividends are paid.136 Once
again, this factor is not equal for all types of stock purchases.
Comparatively, few large publicly traded companies do not pay
dividends, whereas many smaller businesses either do not have the
profits necessary to pay dividends or distribute profits to the owners
(who are also employees) in the form of additional compensation so as
to minimize corporate taxation.137
Although most of the risk associated with buying stock is in buying
shares in start-up companies and companies making IPOs, investors
overwhelmingly put their money elsewhere when purchasing stock.
Total IPOs on the NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange rose only
19.1 billion in 2010.138 By comparison, 6.3 billion shares on average
were traded every day on these exchanges as of May 2011.139 Single day
trading in July 2011 by a single brokerage house in stocks listed on the
Dow Jones Industrial Average, S&P500 and NASDAQ averaged 23
billion.140 Thus, the reality is that the overwhelming majority of passive
135. There remains, however, an opportunity cost that continues to exist. By buying
one stock, one forecloses, at least temporarily, the possibility of using that money to
buy something that could generate a better return.
136. One commentator has noted that the Dow Jones Industrial Average would have
been over 233,000, as compared to 10,000, in 2000 had the index included dividends in
the measure of return to investors. John B. Shoven & Clemens Sialm, The Dow Jones
Industrial Average: The Impact of Fixing Its Flaws (SIEPR Policy paper No. 99-16),
available at http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/99-16.pdf.
137. Shawn M. Forbes & John Hatem, NYSE & AMEX Listed Firms That Pay No
Dividend: A Recent History, 11 J. FIN. & STRATEGIC DECISIONS 1 (1998); see generally
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 13 (smaller, growing companies often do
not pay dividends).
138. Lee Spears, U.S. IPOs Raise Lowest Amount in Decade Versus Cash Aim,
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 23, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0923/u-s-ipos-raise-lowest-amount-in-decade-compared-to-cash-sought.html.
139. Thomas Lauricella, Traders Exit High-Speed Lane, WSJ.COM, http://online.w
sj.com/article/SB10001424052748704322804576303543741007746.html. It should be
noted, however, that IPOs would be included in these totals.
140. Knight Capital Group, Volume Statistics, KNIGHT.COM, http://www.knight.com
/ourfirm/volumestats.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2010)
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investors141 in corporations are taking little risk in buying stock because
of the types of stocks they are choosing to buy—those of established
companies.
2. Labor’s Risk or Lack Thereof
Turning to the other side of this premise, it is worth asking whether
it can truly be said that labor takes no risk. Admittedly, workers take
little risk of not being compensated for their contributions given their
routine of showing up to work and being compensated for the time they
put in.142 Nevertheless, even the average worker risks more than has
historically been acknowledged.143
An employee who goes to work for a company ties himself to the
fate of that company; and there is an opportunity cost for the worker in
selecting a given employer over others.144 For instance, workers develop
skills and expertise suitable to the business in which they work.145 If an
employee’s company goes bankrupt, that worker may be unemployable,
practically speaking, unless there is another comparable business nearby
141. There is also a significant amount invested in closely held, small “family”
businesses (based on the total number of such businesses, not the amount invested on a
per business basis). However, these investors are also running the day-to-day
operations. See William Patterson University, The Economic Impact of Closely Held
Businesses, WPUNJ.edu, http://www.wpunj.edu/CloselyHeld/EconomicImpact.dot.
Such businesses have not traditionally been the ones searching for large amounts of
“scarce” capital, but rather have been capitalized by those running the business. See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 13 (stating that many small businesses
have only debt, no outside equity). Furthermore, as active investors running day-to-day
operations, they are in a sense a hybrid class of investor/worker risking both their time
and their money in the hopes of creating a successful operation. Additionally, as the
parties actually running the business, they have greater control over the risks the
business chooses to make when compared to the traditional, passive investor.
142. A small percentage of workers will perform work for which they are not
compensated because the business becomes insolvent before they are paid, but this
represents an insignificant percentage of the overall labor performed in the U.S.
143. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 57, at 47-53; Greenfield, supra note 57, at
303-309; O’Connor, supra note 45, at 907-08.
144. See generally Greenfield, supra note 57, at 307; O’Connor, supra note 45, at
907 § 1.
145. McDonnell, supra note 57, at 349-50; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 57, at 4953; Greenfield, supra note 57, at 309; O’Connor, supra note 45, at 908, 910, 915.
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where the worker can seek employment.146 On a facially comparative
basis, the risk taken by the worker is similar to that of the investor—for
each there is an overall low likelihood of business failure. Nevertheless,
if failure does occur, the investor loses capital and the worker loses his
job and marketability, having developed skills and expertise that are
potentially job-specific and not transferable.
Indeed, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that workers risk
even more in absolute terms. Investors typically risk excess capital;
people put extra money they have into the stock market, not the money
they need for food and rent. Workers, on the other hand, risk their very
means of existence when they tie their futures to a particular business.
Unlike the risk taken by capital, which decreases over time as dividends
are paid,147 the risk to labor actually increases over time. A worker’s
marketability generally decreases with time, rendering the failure of a
business all the more devastating to a fifty-year-old worker than to a
twenty-five-year-old worker.148 Furthermore, for publicly traded
companies, a shareholder can easily sell his investment to cut off future
risk. In contrast, an employee may have no real comparable job
opportunities available—his fate essentially tied to his employer until
retirement. Shareholders can also diversify their risk by investing in
multiple corporations, whereas workers cannot.149

146. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 57, at 51. Many workers, particularly as they get
older, are as a practical matter unable to move. This may be simply because of a lack of
funds to move to a new area in hopes of finding new employment, particularly when the
worker has lost a job and the income that accompanies it. Even those with employment
available and employers that are willing to cover moving expenses are often
constrained by other factors such as a divorce (creating a difficult choice between
abandoning one’s children for a decent job or being under-employed to remain near to
them), or by the inability to sell one’s home for enough to cover the mortgage. Looking
solely at the last of these factors, 23% of homeowners had mortgages exceeding the
value of their homes in the third quarter of 2009. See Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty,
One in Four Borrowers is Underwater, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1
25903489722661849.html; see also O’Connor, supra note 45, at 910.
147. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
148. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 57, at 49-52; see generally O’Connor, supra note
45, at 907-10.
149. See McDonnell, supra note 57, at 350; Greenfield, supra note 57, at 309.
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The risks faced by labor are even more acute if one considers that
there are no fiduciary duties owed to workers by companies.150 Under
the traditional corporate system, corporate managers must maximize
shareholder profits. Owing no fiduciary duties of any type to labor, it is
not only permissible, but in essence mandated, that if a corporation can
make greater profits by closing its factory doors in the U.S. and moving
abroad where labor and other production costs are lower, it must do
so.151 This has become a commonplace occurrence in the U.S., and is
more likely to occur than bankruptcy.152 Moreover, although this
corporate action has the potential to destroy the lives of workers left
unemployed, it does not hurt investors. Rather it often provides them
with additional profits.
Furthermore, even the basic tenet that workers are fully
compensated for their services is less true than most imagine.153 This is
not only because of their firm specific investment in human capital. In
the U.S. today, pension and retirement plans are common features of the
compensation owed to a worker.154 However, a staggering number of
these plans are unfunded or under-funded, so there is a significant risk
that the workers covered will not receive the compensation to which
they are entitled.155 Given this risk and the absence of fiduciary duties
owed to labor, there is a growing trend toward eliminating such plans.156

150. One can argue that some states now have such duties, but the statutory
provision is permissive rather than mandatory, except in one state. See supra note 64.
However, workers have no means to enforce such rights even when they do exist. See
O’Connor, supra note 45, at 951-52; Macey, supra note 61, at 23; Van Wezel Stone,
supra note 57.
151. This is no longer true in a number of states given that corporate boards in such
states have been statutorily authorized to consider the interests of other constituencies.
However, workers have no standing even in such states to contest a decision to move a
factory offshore. O’Connor, supra note 45, at 951-52; Macey, supra note 61, at 1.
152. See NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 1, at 17, 55-56, 61-62, 71-73; see also
FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 114-127; NEWMAN & DE YOYSA, supra note 60, at 27, 191;
Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 11.
153. For a discussion of employees as residual claimants, see Greenfield, supra note
57, at 303-309; O’Connor, supra note 45, at 907-08; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 57,
at 47-53.
154. Greenfield, supra note 57, at 306-309.
155. David S. Hilzenrath, Stock Losses Leave Pension Funds Underfunded, WASH.
POST, Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
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In sum, although investors do indeed take risk, historical
characterizations overstate the risk to capital and, at the same time, fail
to consider the risks taken by labor.
E. FACTORS OVERLOOKED BY THE HISTORICAL MODEL
The four historical premises for the allocation of corporate duties
discussed above have not only ceased to be true today, but also fail to
consider two important new elements:
1. Labor Contributes More Than Capital Over Time
2. Capital Does Not Go Where It Is Most Needed
Each of these elements raises additional issues that should be
addressed in creating a legal regime that properly balances the relative
risks and contributions of labor and capital.
1. Labor Contributes More Than Capital Over Time
There can be no doubt that businesses need both labor and capital
to succeed. However, labor contributes more to the success of a
corporation than capital over time based on the very nature of its
contributions.
A business receives a contribution from capital only once—when
the shareholder first buys stock for cash. While that money is essential
to the initial success of the entity, over time such contributions can
become a drop in the bucket compared to retained earnings.157
Moreover, only the initial issuance of stock benefits the corporation,
whereas profits from all subsequent sales of the stock belong solely to
the selling shareholders.158

/2009/01/07/AR2009010701387.html; Underfunded Pension Plans: The Next Shoe to
Drop?, DIVIDENDS VALUE (May 5, 2009), http://dividendsvalue.com/2963/underfunded
-pension-plans-the-next-shoe-to-drop/.
156. Geoffrey Colin, The end of a dream, CNN MONEY, available at http://money.
cnn.com/2006/06/12/magazines/fortune/pension_retirementguide_fortune/index.htm.
157. See supra Part 2.D.1.
158. However, the potential profits to be made by selling stock are a crucial
component to the investor’s initial willingness to risk capital by purchasing stock.
Therefore, a secondary market is an important factor in attracting investment.
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Labor, on the other hand, makes ongoing contributions in the form
of not only manual labor but also the continuous infusion of creativity
and new ideas.159 Historically, a company might have been able to
survive or even thrive on a single good idea for decades or more, but in
the information age, a company cannot survive without continually
reinventing itself by introducing new products.160
While in the infancy of a business, capital and labor may both make
significant contributions, labor makes a larger impact on the continuing
success of the enterprise over time.
2. Capital Does Not Go Where It Is Most Needed
Capital need not be scarce in the information age, and yet
corporations are not the primary beneficiaries of the vast sums of
capital dedicated to the stock market.161 As previously discussed,
corporations benefit from capital only when stocks are first issued, yet
ironically this is where capital is most scarce.162 As a result, profits
move back and forth in the secondary market where all the benefits of
such trading go to individual investors as opposed to the corporations
issuing such stock.
If scarcity of capital is indeed a concern, society should create a
model that promotes such capital going to where it is needed most.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Given that the historical premises underlying the creation of current
U.S. corporate duties and ownership concepts are no longer true and that
these historical premises also fail to consider important additional
factors, as discussed above, it is essential that a new structure of duties
and ownership rights be developed to reflect current societal realities.
Whereas traditional corporate law both overstates the need for,
159. See supra Part 2C; Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 114, 23;
O’Connor, supra note 45, at 901, 911-13.
160. Id.
161. Over six billion shares are traded every day on the NYSE and NASDAQ. See
Lauricella, supra note 139. This does not include any of the other stock exchanges in
the world.
162. See supra Part 2.D.1.
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contribution of and risk taken by capital, and understates the
contribution of and risk taken by labor, there must be a shift away from
a system where the corporation exists with duties owed solely to its
shareholders. A new paradigm must embrace the idea that some set of
duties are owed to and possessed by labor, thereby moving away from a
system that legitimizes the single-minded pursuit of maximizing
shareholder profits.
In addition, establishing a new legal regime that incorporates duties
to labor presents two other important considerations. First, substantial
legal scholarship has focused on additional reasons why workers or
other constituencies might be entitled to various rights or duties beyond
those discussed in this Article. Arguments have been put forth, for
example, in support of worker profit sharing, share ownership, voting
rights, the power to sue derivatively, fiduciary duties for workers and
(board) representation as a means to increase productivity/innovation,
equality, democracy and responsible business decision-making.163 These
proposals, the merits of which are beyond the scope of this Article, are
generally further supported by this Article’s contention that the premises
supporting the current corporate structure are no longer true. Moreover,
to the degree these other considerations are relevant, they should be
woven into the creation of a new paradigm of corporate duties and
rights.
Second, although this Article has argued that certain premises of
corporate law no longer hold entirely true, they are not completely false
either. Specifically, this Article’s assertions that each premise no longer
applies are a reflection of trends in American business that do not
necessarily apply to every U.S. corporation. For instance, there are some
companies in the U.S. that require large sums of capital, as well as
others that manage to survive with limited, relatively unchanging
product lines. Moreover, the realities of small, closely held businesses
have not changed nearly as dramatically as those of large publicly held
corporations,164 and just as not all companies look to their workers for
163. See David Millon, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; O’Connor, supra note 45, at 936-54,
902, 904; Robert B. Moberly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective
Bargaining, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 765 (1985); Dana Muir, Groundings of Voice in
Employee Rights, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2003); McDonnell, supra note 57;
Greenfield, supra note 57.
164. As has been noted, closely held businesses by and large do not require as much
capital, and look to their operators as investors. As such, the scarcity of capital plays a
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new ideas, not all workers contribute to the continual reinvention of
business.165 Thus, it is clear that any solution based on the realities of
today must embrace both the predominant situation and possible
exceptions. The resulting new paradigm must be adaptable to
accommodate varying situations and may require shifting duties and
rights depending upon the circumstances at hand.
Despite these difficulties, a nuanced approach to future rights and
duties arises as a potential solution: a springing profit sharing right for
workers.166 This solution addresses the significant, but not total, erosion
of the foundational premises, as well as the unconsidered failings of
these premises, both of which are discussed in this Article.
As previously discussed, investors of capital take risks, but this risk
diminishes over time as a business grows, dividends are paid, stock
appreciates in value and a company becomes publicly traded. Labor on
the other hand takes little risk initially since salaries are paid, but takes
an increasing risk over time as expertise develops, pensions vest and
other career opportunities are foreclosed. Similarly, investors make a
major contribution early in the life of a corporation when it has no
profits and no ability to borrow absent collateral or an operations
history, however, they do not contribute to the corporation again after
the stock issuance. In contrast, labor performs assigned tasks initially,
but over time contributes more to the success of the business by helping
it to develop new products and otherwise reinvent itself to meet rapidly
changing demands in the modern market. In light of the opposing
lesser role for these entities. See supra note141. Additionally, the owner-operators of
these businesses risk both capital and labor, so discussions of comparative risk and
contribution do not directly apply as easily to them. As such, the closely held family
business may not need an adjustment in its duties unless it decides to expand by
offering stock to the public or manages to grow beyond a certain number of employees.
165. However, recent data suggests that companies should look to all their workers
for innovation to succeed in an ever more competitive world. Deloitte Center for the
Edge, supra note 42, at 23, 114, 124-126.
166. This springing right could actually take other forms such voting rights or share
ownership with appropriate adjustments, particularly if other factors beyond the scope
of this Article are considered. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. However,
this Article couches the right as an economic entitlement to a portion of the profits since
the basis for arguing that change is necessary to the basic corporate duty paradigm has
been made by focusing on economic concerns—relative risks taken by labor and
capital, the need for capital, the scarcity of capital and the non-scarcity of labor.
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trajectories taken by labor and capital with respect to relative risk and
contribution, the duties owed and rights possessed by each should adjust
correspondingly.
Early in the life of a corporation, its duties should be most focused
on the shareholders—on minimizing their risk and returning their capital
with a profit. However, once the shareholders have been amply repaid
for their one-time contributions, the duties owed to them should
diminish. As the company continues to operate, it will have to reinvent
itself and its product lines to remain competitive, with the source of this
renewal being its employees.
One model that would reallocate rights between investors and
workers would be to give employees a mandatory right to profit sharing
in a corporation once it has repaid investors the full amount of their
initial contributions together with a reasonable profit167—a return on
investment at a level that would preserve the incentive to put forth
capital. Using a familiar model for comparison, corporations would
essentially be treating their shareholders as owners of preferred stock,
those owners who receive the first cut of the corporation’s profits. This
approach would not increase the risk of capital flight because investors
167. Reasonable profit must be a market driven analysis and would need to be
determined by considering likely returns from other forms of investment so that an
adequate percentage profit could be determined. Under current economic conditions,
such a return might be the initial investment plus 6-8% cumulative annual interest, but
this is merely offered as a ballpark figure for illustration purposes. See Bankrate.com,
IRA Search Engine, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/rate/today_avg_iradep.asp for
current average bank certificate of deposit interest rates and U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/d
ata-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield for current treasury bill
interest rates. This market driven rate would be fixed at the time of the stock’s issuance
by reference to a federal index. Likewise, one could argue over the percentage of profits
that should be allocated to labor. Given the relative risks and contributions of capital
and labor, an equal split of profits to capital and labor (after capital investments plus
reasonable profits have been returned) seems reasonable to the author, but this is merely
a suggestion based on the author’s perception of the current state of the premises
underlying the historic model. Alternatively, the percentage could be adjusted to
different industry types so that those with greater capital requirements (such as heavy
manufacturing) allocate a lower percentage and those with higher employee
contributions and lower production costs (such as digital products) receive a higher
percentage. Furthermore, labor’s right to profit sharing need not be an all or nothing
proposition; the right could always exist at a relatively low percentage and as capital is
repaid or other benchmarks are reached, this percentage could increase.
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would be adequately rewarded for their risk before profit sharing would
arise for workers.168 Moreover, if profits were not to reach an adequate
level, shareholders would get all of the earnings and the workers would
get none. In fact, if a company had to return capital plus a market-driven
cumulative return before employee profit sharing kicked in, many
companies would never move into a profit sharing phase.169 This model
accurately accounts for and rewards the actual risks and contributions of
labor and capital in two ways. First, until investors receive a reasonable
profit, capital continues to be taking most of the risk. Second, the most
successful companies are likely to be those in which the most innovation
occurs as a result of labor’s contributions.
Notably, a number of technical difficulties would need to be
overcome to make such a system viable. Shareholders, who both elect
managers and are likely to prefer to continue receiving all profits, might
look for ways to avoid triggering the worker’s profit sharing phase. For
example, if only dividends are counted towards the capital return,
companies would likely withhold dividends to keep the aggregate return
below the profit sharing trigger. Thus, return would have to include both
dividends received and appreciation in stock value.170
168. However, once a company moves into the profit sharing phase, the value of the
stock would be diminished as investors receive lower dividends since profits would
have to be split between labor and capital. This should not be crippling, however, as the
shareholders still retain the underlying equity interest in the company and it is only
profits that are being divided. In other words, stock appreciation would slow but the
underlying valuation should not be affected dramatically. There is also some risk of
capital flight if investors feel this profit sharing regime diminishes the value of
investing in a U.S. company too much compared to the advantages of investing
elsewhere. This risk should not be overstated, however. The U.S. is currently the
world’s largest single capital market for a number of reasons. See Capital Flow
Analysis, The Big Picture, http://www.capital-flow-analysis.com/investment-tutorial/p
icture.html (last visited Oct 21, 2012); EDWARD F. GREENE, U.S. REGULATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES, Vol. 1, LXV (9th ed. 2005). In spite of
massive shifts to manufacturing overseas, U.S. companies have remained incorporated
in the U.S. Furthermore, many of the huge number of small businesses owned by U.S.
citizens would be ill-suited to reincorporating and operating overseas. The risk seems
most likely to have negative repercussions with regard to foreigners trying to decide
where to incorporate.
169. See generally Deloitte Center for the Edge, supra note 42, at 115-18.
170. Including appreciation in value bolsters the argument that the model proposed
should be applied exclusively to publicly traded companies. For one thing, determining
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Alternatively, a company might avoid profit sharing for workers by
avoiding the retention of labor altogether. For instance, a company
might set up a parallel company that exists solely to lease employees to
the first enterprise at the exact cost of such labor. Such an arrangement
would allow the owners of the first company to keep all of the
company’s profits while the second company would have no profits to
share. To combat such tactics, corporate law might recognize affiliated
leasing and operating companies as one entity or could otherwise
consider leased employees to be employees of the lessee for profit
sharing purposes.
Moreover, a company might try to avoid triggering worker profit
sharing by occasionally issuing additional tranches of stock so that it
always has at least some shares that have not been repaid their capital
investment. Regulation and oversight over such issuances might address
this issue, but not without a significant impact on corporate governance
and decision-making given the myriad legitimate reasons for issuing
more stock. A better approach might be to lump repaid capital and labor
into one category and more recently issued capital that has not been
repaid into another. Once again, turning to the preferred stock model,
newly issued stock would get a higher preferred distribution and repaid
capital, labor and the new stock would all share in the remainder of any
distribution. This treatment would be similar to that of participating
preferred stock and common stock. Because the original shareholders
would move into a secondary payment category under this scenario, this
should provide incentives not to use additional stock issuances except
for legitimate purposes and to be careful with regard to the rights and
benefits given to the newly issued shares.
Finally, the effects of mandatory profit sharing for workers upon
existing companies must be considered. Under the proposed model,
most would either be exempt as closely held family businesses or would
not have a sufficient return to trigger profit sharing.171 Nevertheless,
there are companies that have already been highly successful and repaid
appreciation is far more difficult without an ongoing market price for the stock. More
importantly, the investor in a closely held entity cannot readily liquidate the investment
to access such return.
171. Determining the rate of return for already issued stock could be handled either
by a somewhat arbitrary rate tied to recent historical market factors or rates could be set
tied to the year of original stock issuance. Either choice presents a number of
difficulties given that such stock may have exchanged hands multiple times.
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their capital contributions, such as many on the Dow and the S&P500.172
To force these companies to immediately share a significant percentage
of their profits could have a detrimental impact on the market. As such,
a phase-in for profit sharing in such companies, starting at a low
percentage and working up over a number of years, would be prudent.173
In addition, mandatory profit sharing for companies that have
succeeded in returning capital and a market driven profit to investors
would have several ancillary benefits beyond addressing the inequities
of continuing to follow a regime based on premises that are no longer
valid. First, as has been noted by others arguing in favor of profit
sharing for employees on other grounds, profit sharing creates incentives
that increase worker productivity, decrease worker turnover (thereby
lowering training costs) and increase worker morale.174 Similarly, it
provides additional funds to workers, thereby allowing them a chance to
become investors in their own right.
More importantly, for investors looking for maximum returns on
their investment, exchanging stocks in long-established companies
through the secondary market will no longer provide the returns it once
did. As profits are split between the investors and the workers, dividends
will decrease, stock appreciation will decrease, or both will occur. To
capture all the profits a company is making, an investor must invest in a
company that is not in the profit sharing phase. In other words, there
will be a much greater incentive to invest in startup ventures and IPOs.
Given that capital has always been scarcest for these types of
companies, this regime will help fund the development of the next

172.
173.

See Shoven & Sialm, supra note 136.
A phase-in of this kind would also dilute any unfair affects from the move to
worker profit sharing on recent secondary purchasers of stock. Overall, the impact of
mandatory worker profit sharing may not be as large as it first appears given that about
forty percent of companies already have profit sharing regimes in place (at much lower
percentages than the author proposes). See Lee Ann Obringer, How Employee
Compensation Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM http://money.howstuffworks.com/benefits
7.htm (Oct. 21, 2012). These programs would almost certainly be eliminated were such
a regime to be adopted, and the savings from the elimination of these programs would
help offset the effects of mandatory profit sharing.
174. See, e.g., Erik Poutsma & Willem de Nijs, Financial Participation in the 1990s
– Dissemination and Challenges, 20 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 163, 166 (1999).
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generation of American businesses, fueling innovation and creating
much needed jobs in the U.S.
CONCLUSION
The common law has always looked to society to resolve its
disputes. Judges decide cases based on actual controversies by looking
to what is customary or by asking what a reasonable person would do.
This inquiry is used to create premises about how society works, and
these premises are the foundation for our rules. Unfortunately, over time
such premises become enshrined in precedent and are blindly parroted
as the basis for legislation even though the world upon which they were
based has faded into the past. Members of the legal profession have a
duty to reexamine periodically the foundational principles of the legal
order.
The move from the industrial age into the information age has
caused such widespread and pervasive changes to the way we order our
lives and conduct business that it is now time to undertake such a
review. Our foundational premises are no longer valid in various areas
of law, including contracts, intellectual property and corporate law.
In particular, corporate law has established that duties are owed
solely to shareholders, based on four premises that collectively represent
the idea that capital is the only contribution to a corporation important
enough to merit a duty being owed to its contributors. The modern
world shows us, however, that these four premises no longer hold true,
and that today capital contributes less and labor contributes far more
than was historically the case. As such, it is time to rethink the duties a
corporation owes to its contributors of labor and capital and to recognize
that certain duties should be owed to workers, as well as shareholders.
In restructuring such duties, it is important to consider that the
contributions of capital are greatest early in the life of a corporation and
that the contributions of labor increase over time. For this reason, a
static model of duties owed may not be the best model for the modern
world.

